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BENJAMIN I. SACHS  
 
Reinhardt at Work 
In his thirty years as a judge, Stephen Reinhardt has authored more than 
150 labor and employment opinions for the Ninth Circuit.
1 Indeed, it would be 
hard to identify a single question concerning the law of work about which 
Judge Reinhardt has not written at least one major decision. In addition to its 
sheer size and scope, Judge Reinhardt’s jurisprudence also reflects a remarkable 
grasp  of  the  overall  structure  of  U.S.  labor  and  employment  law.  From 
questions as fundamental as who is an employee
2 and what constitutes work,
3 
to issues as complex and esoteric as how to define common situs picketing,
4 the 
Judge is at home and at ease in this area of law. At their best, Reinhardt’s labor 
and  employment  opinions  display  a  technical  virtuosity  impressive  to  both 
seasoned practitioners and legal academics. This feature of his opinions should 
come as no surprise: Judge Reinhardt practiced as a labor lawyer before taking 
the bench in 1980 (making him nearly unique among his colleagues on the 
 
author. Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Professor Sachs clerked for Judge 
Reinhardt  from  1998  to  1999.  The  author  thanks  Rebecca  Livengood  for  excellent  research 
assistance.  
1.   According to a search of both LexisNexis and Westlaw, Judge Reinhardt is the author of 153 
majority opinions in labor and employment cases, including panel and en banc decisions. 
2.   See, e.g., Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981). 
3.   See, e.g., Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2004). 
4.   See, e.g., NLRB v. Ironworkers Local 433, 850 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1988). As the leading treatise 
defines it, “[a] common situs is a site on which two or more employers are engaged in normal 
business operations.” 2 SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAW § 22.II.C.2, at 1768 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006). The issue is 
relevant to the question of whether picketing is permissible. See Ironworkers Local 433, 850 
F.2d at 553-54.    
the yale law journal  120:573    2010 
574 
 
federal courts of appeals
5), and he came to his judgeship already possessing a 
firm grasp of the statutory and decisional landscape. 
But the Judge’s labor and employment jurisprudence is defined by more 
than  its  scope  and  technical  accomplishment.  In  fact,  Judge  Reinhardt’s 
writing in these areas is recognizable both for a consistent substantive vision of 
what labor and employment law intends to accomplish and for the Judge’s 
method  of  interpreting  these  statutes.  The  substantive  theme  that  runs 
through  these  opinions  is  a  straightforward  one:  labor  and  employment 
statutes are written to enable workers’ own efforts to make their lives better. 
He views the law as a vehicle for, and a facilitator of, worker empowerment—a 
view,  at  bottom,  that  labor  and  employment  statutes  do  not  merely  grant 
particular workplace rights, but, perhaps more importantly, enable workers to 
fight for themselves. 
Running alongside this substantive vision of labor and employment law is 
a tool of interpretation that the Judge deploys to resolve these cases. Namely, 
the Judge relies on his own understanding—informed by years of practice—of 
how  law  actually  operates  in  the  world  of  work,  in  the  world  of  union 
organizing, and in the world of labor-management relations. His opinions are 
full of references to what the Judge, humbly of course, refers to as “reality”—
the  “realities  of  collective  bargaining,”
6  the  “reality  of  day-to-day  labor 
relations,”
7 and “the practical realities of labor-management relations.”
8 What 
these  phrases  capture  is  the  Judge’s  insistence  that  labor  and  employment 
statutes be interpreted pragmatically. He demands that the court understand 
how things actually work before deciding how the law should be construed. 
Although many cases could be cited to highlight these themes, three will 
serve  our  purpose  here.  The  first  concerns  the  scope  of  the  anti-retaliation 
clause of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
9 The second deals with the 
ability of undocumented immigrant workers to assert rights granted by Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
10 And the third takes up the ability of 
unions to spend dues money on organizing new workers.
11 Because each of 
 
5.   Though not entirely unique: for example, Judge Marsha Berzon, also of the Ninth Circuit, 
was a prominent labor attorney before joining the court. 
6.   United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760, 768 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
7.   Ironworkers Local 433, 850 F.2d at 556. 
8.   Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1258 (9th Cir. 1985). 
9.   See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
10.   See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 
11.   See UFCW, Local 1036, 307 F.3d 760.    
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these opinions is significant in a number of additional ways—beyond the two 
themes that are the focus here—this Feature will also note some of the cases’ 
broader implications. 
i.  anti-retaliation protection 
Judge Reinhardt’s concern for worker empowerment—his view of the law 
as protecting workers’ ability to fight for themselves, not simply as extending 
workplace entitlements—is expressed first and foremost in cases dealing with 
employer retaliation. Perhaps the best example comes in the context of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. The FLSA sets the federal minimum wage and requires 
that covered employees receive overtime premium pay: if a covered employee 
works more than forty hours in a week, she is entitled to earn one and one-half 
times her regular rate for the overtime hours.
12 The statute, through its anti-
retaliation clause, also offers protection to employees who seek to enforce these 
rights.
13 
In the early 1990s, the Seattle SuperSonics (Sonics)—at the time, an NBA 
basketball  team—began  paying  its  ticket  sales  agents  $166.67  a  month  in 
“overtime pay” regardless of how many hours of overtime the agents actually 
worked.
14  Believing,  correctly,  that  this  pay  scheme  was  illegal  and  in 
contravention  of  the  FLSA’s  overtime  provisions,  a  group  of  sales  agents 
decided to request that management reform the pay practice. They chose two 
“representatives”  to  deal  with  management—including  the  named  plaintiff, 
Laura Lambert—and succeeded in convincing the Sonics’s management to pay 
the agents the actual overtime wages that were owed. Nonetheless, less than a 
week after the Sonics settled the workers’ overtime claim, the team reorganized 
its ticket sales operations. As a result, all of the agents involved in the effort to 
secure overtime pay were fired; in fact, the one agent not dismissed by the 
Sonics was the one agent who had not complained about the Sonics’s payment 
scheme.
15 
The case seemed like a clear-cut example of illegal retaliation. A Seattle jury 
agreed: it awarded the agents nearly $700,000 in lost wages and $12 million in 
punitive  damages.
16  On  appeal,  however,  a  three-judge  panel  of  the  Ninth 
 
12.   See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206-207 (2006). 
13.   See id. § 215(a)(3). 
14.   See Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1001. 
15.   See id. at 1001-02. 
16.   See id. at 1002. The punitive damages award was remitted to approximately $4 million. See 
id.    
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Circuit held that the anti-retaliation clause of the FLSA does not apply when 
workers complain to their employers about violations of the Act.
17 The clause 
makes  it  illegal  for  an  employer  to  discharge  or  discriminate  against  any 
employee because the employee has “filed any complaint . . . under or related to 
this chapter.”
18 The panel read the statutory term “filed” to mean filed with a 
court or with the U.S. Department of Labor. On this reading of the statute, 
because  Lambert and  the other  agents  had  taken  their  complaint  to  Sonics 
management,  they  had  not  “filed”  a  complaint  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statute, and thus there was no cognizable retaliation. 
Rehearing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel’s decision 
in  an opinion  written  by Judge  Reinhardt.  In  holding  that  the  FLSA  anti-
retaliation  clause  covers  complaints  made  to  employers,  Judge  Reinhardt’s 
opinion begins by setting out a substantive vision of the statute’s purpose. 
Most broadly, and quoting from a 1944 Supreme Court decision, the opinion 
argues  that  the  FLSA  is  “remedial  and  humanitarian  in  purpose”  and 
continues: “‘We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but 
with the rights of those who toil . . . . Those are rights that Congress has 
specifically legislated to protect. Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied 
in a narrow, grudging manner.’”
19 
More  particularly,  the  opinion  stresses  that  FLSA  enforcement  depends 
upon workers coming forward to assert their rights under the statute, and thus 
the statutory scheme can function only if the anti-retaliation clause eliminates 
the “fear of economic retaliation.”
20 In Judge Reinhardt’s words: 
The FLSA’s anti-retaliation clause is designed to ensure that employees 
are not compelled to risk their jobs in order to assert their wage and 
hour rights under the Act. Construing the anti-retaliation provision to 
exclude from its protection all those employees who seek to obtain fair 
treatment and a remedy for a perceived violation of the Act from their 
employers would jeopardize the protection promised by the provision 
and discourage employees from asserting their rights.
21 
Having  reached  a  conclusion  about  the  meaning  of  the  anti-retaliation 
clause by examining the purpose and structure of the statute, the opinion then 
 
17.   See id. 
18.   29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
19.   Lambert,  180  F.3d  at  1003  (alteration  in  original)  (quoting  Tenn.  Coal,  Iron  &  R.R.  v. 
Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)). 
20.   Id.  
21.   Id. at 1004.    
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turns to examine the particular words of the clause. Here the Judge’s practical 
experience is brought to bear. Unlike the panel, the en banc court finds that the 
phrase “filed any complaint” is broad enough to reach complaints, like the one 
here, made directly to employers. Why? Because, as Judge Reinhardt points 
out, in the parlance of the workplace, employees file grievances—usually in 
union  shops,  but  in  some  non-union  firms  as  well—with  their  employers. 
Finding it reasonable to assume that Congress was aware of this practice in 
1938 when it drafted the FLSA, the court holds that complaints “filed” with 
employers are sufficient to satisfy the statute’s requirement.
22 
The Lambert opinion makes this point in a brief sentence or two, but it is 
worth pausing to observe that the point is undoubtedly correct. Indeed, at the 
time Congress drafted the FLSA and its anti-retaliation clause, the National 
Labor Relations Board itself used the term “filed” to describe internal firm 
grievance procedures.
23 Collective bargaining agreements drafted at the time 
also spoke of the “filing” of grievances by employees with their union or their 
employers. For example, the collective bargaining agreement signed in July 
1937 between Teamsters Local 584 and Sheffield Farms Company stated that 
“[a]ny  employee  having  a  grievance  shall  have  the  privilege  of  filing  such 
grievance with the steward within three days.”
24 The same terminology is used 
to this day, with collective bargaining agreements routinely speaking of the 
“filing” of grievances or complaints by employees with employers, even in cases 
where the grievance is “filed” orally.
25 
 
22.   The Supreme Court recently has granted certiorari to resolve a closely related question: 
whether  oral  complaints  made  to  employers  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  Fair  Labor 
Standards  Act’s  anti-retaliation  clause.  See  Brief  for  the  Petitioner  at  i,  Kasten  v.  Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 09-834 (June 16, 2010), 2010 WL 2481867. 
23.   See, e.g., In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 232 (1938) (“Requests for changes in 
rates  of  pay  were  to  be  considered  closed  upon  a  decision  of  the  proper  committee  of 
Employee Representatives and the Management, unless an appeal was filed in writing by an 
employee or his Representative with the Management Representative within a period of 3 
days after the decision was rendered.”) (emphasis added). 
24.   In re Basile, 10 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1938). 
25.   As one court has observed, in the standard collective bargaining agreement, “[i]n order to 
set the machinery of the grievance process in motion, the aggrieved employee [is] required 
to file a complaint with his or her immediate supervisor.” Dalton v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp. 
(U.S.),  979  F.  Supp.  1187,  1189  (S.D.  Ohio  1997).  By  way  of  example,  the  collective 
bargaining agreement in force between the Service Employees International Union, Local 
1199E-DC, and Maryland General Hospital states that “[a]ll grievances shall be presented 
orally . . . but the date of filing same shall be recorded on a form provided by the Hospital.” 
Agreement Between Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, AFL-CIO Dist. 1199E-DC & Md. Gen. Hosp. 
§ 13.4 (Dec. 1, 1999) (on file with author); see also, e.g., Agreement Between Commc’ns 
Workers  of  Am.  &  Bell  Atl.  N.J.,  Inc.  art.  74  (Aug.  9,  1998),  available  at    
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The Lambert opinion thus protects employees’ ability to secure their own 
rights at work, and does so by relying on Judge Reinhardt’s practical reasoning 
about  the  world  of  work.  Beyond  highlighting  these  twin  themes  of 
Reinhardt’s  labor  and  employment  jurisprudence,  the  opinion  also  has  a 
broader significance, one that impacts employees’ ability to use employment 
law as a channel for collective action. As many have now explained, the federal 
statute expressly designed to protect workers’ collective efforts to improve their 
work  lives—the  National  Labor  Relations  Act  (NLRA)—is  largely 
dysfunctional. That law’s narrow range of coverage, its weak remedies, and its 
time-consuming procedures mean that workers’ rights to engage in concerted 
activity for mutual aid and protection are violated with near impunity.
26 In the 
face  of  the  NLRA’s  failure,  one  potential  alternative  legal  channel  lies  in 
employment laws like the FLSA. Workers can, and do, rely on employment 
statutes as both the locus of their collective efforts to secure workplace change 
and as the legal architecture that protects such collective action.
27 The ability of 
employment laws to function in this way turns, however, on the reach of the 
statutes’  anti-retaliation  clauses.  By  reading  such  clauses  narrowly,  courts 
foreclose one of the few viable avenues for workers’ collective action. On the 
other  hand,  by  reading  these  clauses  broadly,  courts  enable  a  partial  but 
important response to the pathology of the NLRA. In this light, then, Judge 
Reinhardt’s opinion in Lambert provides employees with the opportunity to 
replace  a  failed  statutory  regime  with  a  workable  alternative:  to  use 
employment law as a form of labor law. 
ii. insulating workers from immigration-based 
retaliation 
Lambert is in many ways the classic retaliation case: employees go to their 
employer to demand compliance with an employment statute, and they get 
fired for doing so. As the opinion makes clear, this type of employer conduct 
creates  a  “‘fear  of  economic  retaliation’”  that  is  quite  effective  at  deterring 
workers  from  attempting  to  vindicate  workplace  rights.
28  For  immigrant 
 
http://irle.berkeley.edu/library/pdf/0298.pdf  (“Fourteen  (14)  days  from  the  date  the 
grievance is filed shall be allowed for adjustment of the grievance. . . .”). 
26.   See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 
(2002). 
27.   For a discussion, see Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2685 (2008). 
28.   Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting Mitchell v. 
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)).    
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workers, however, the fear of economic retaliation can be compounded by fears 
of immigration-based reprisal. Immigrant workers, that is, may be deterred 
from seeking to enforce workplace rights by the fear that their immigration 
status will become the focus of employer retribution. 
This issue came before the Ninth Circuit in Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc.
29 The 
case involved twenty-three Latina and Southeast Asian female immigrants who 
worked  on  the  production  line  at  NIBCO’s  factory  in  Fresno,  California. 
Although their job descriptions did not require English proficiency, NIBCO 
required  the  plaintiffs  to  take  basic  job  skills  examinations  given  only  in 
English. The plaintiffs sued, alleging disparate impact discrimination based on 
national origin in violation of Title VII, and sought reinstatement along with 
back  pay  and  punitive  damages.  During  Martha  Rivera’s  deposition,  the 
employer’s counsel asked Rivera where she was born; plaintiffs’ counsel then 
moved  for  a  protective  order  barring  any  further  questions  related  to  the 
plaintiffs’ immigration status.
30 
The  circuit  court  heard  an  appeal from  the  district  court’s  grant of  the 
protective order. Judge Reinhardt’s opinion begins, and in many ways ends, by 
casting the employer’s deposition request as a threat: by asking about Rivera’s 
immigration status, the court understands the employer implicitly to threaten 
Rivera with immigration consequences for her Title VII action. Such a threat is 
impermissible because—much like the employer’s conduct in Lambert—it will 
have the effect of inhibiting workers’ willingness to come forward and assert 
workplace rights. As Judge Reinhardt put it: 
Granting  employers  the  right  to  inquire  into  workers’  immigration 
status in cases like this would allow them to raise implicitly the threat 
of  deportation  and  criminal  prosecution  every  time  a  worker, 
documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices or files a Title 
VII action. Indeed, were we to direct district courts to grant discovery 
requests  for  information  related  to  immigration  status  in  every  case 
involving national origin discrimination under Title VII, countless acts 
of illegal and reprehensible conduct would go unreported.
31 
This  understanding  of  the  employer’s  discovery  request  reflects,  again, 
Judge  Reinhardt’s  appreciation  for  the  practical  world  of  work.  In  Judge 
Reinhardt’s  view—one  that  is  borne  out  by  even  a  cursory  review  of  the 
evidence—immigration  status  is  used  as  a  tool  to  deter  enforcement  of 
 
29.   364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 
30.   See id. at 1061. 
31.   Id. at 1065.    
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workplace rights.
32 Returning to a favorite phrase, Judge Reinhardt thus writes 
that undocumented workers face an even “harsher reality” than documented 
workers;  in  addition  to  economic  retaliation,  these  workers  can  face 
deportation or criminal proceedings when they claim rights at work.
33 Enabling 
immigrant  workers  to  make  such  claims  therefore  requires  that  courts  put 
immigration status off limits to this kind of discovery request. 
NIBCO is more than a discovery case, however. In fact, the opinion is of 
major  relevance  to  the  general  jurisprudence  of  workplace  rights  for 
undocumented workers, a population that now includes about eight million 
people.
34 For several decades, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals 
fairly  consistently  read  the  definition  of  “employee”  within  labor  and 
employment statutes to extend to undocumented immigrants.
35 In the 2002 
case of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, however, the Supreme Court held that the 
NLRB  may  not  award  back  pay  to  an  undocumented  immigrant  who  is 
discharged for engaging in protected union activity.
36 Hoffman makes it more 
difficult for workers—both the undocumented and those who work alongside 
them—to organize unions. But the Hoffman decision also raised the possibility 
that  courts  would  begin  to  curtail  the  rights  of  undocumented  employees 
under other federal labor and employment statutes. In NIBCO, the employer 
made an argument common in the years following Hoffman: by foreclosing 
remedies for undocumented immigrants under the NLRA, the Supreme Court 
 
32.   See id. at 1064 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 886-87 (1984) (discussing how 
an  employer  reported  five  undocumented  workers  after  they  voted  in  favor  of  union 
representation)); Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R’s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 
2002); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (N.D. 
Cal. 1998); see also Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1997). 
33.   NIBCO, 364 F.3d at 1064. 
34.   See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANTS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES,  at  i  (2009),  available  at  http://pewhispanic.org/ 
reports/report.php?ReportID=107. 
35.   See, e.g., Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. 883; NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d 50 
(2d Cir. 1997). For some contrary positions, see, for example, Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 
F.3d 1, 10-15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), which argues that undocumented 
immigrants are not employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act; and 
Egbuna  v.  Time-Life  Libraries,  Inc.,  153  F.3d  184  (4th  Cir.  1998),  which  held  that 
undocumented immigrants are not “qualified” for employment for purposes of Title VII 
remedies. 
36.   Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). The holding applies in 
cases where the employer is not aware of the worker’s immigration status at the time of hire. 
A different rule may apply in cases of a so-called knowing employer. See, e.g., id. at 153 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).    
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has barred undocumented immigrants from seeking remedies under the full 
range of labor and employment statutes. 
NIBCO  constitutes  something  of  a  bulwark  against  such  overbroad 
readings of Hoffman. In rejecting the employer’s claim, the NIBCO court drew 
out three salient differences between the Title VII regime and the NLRA.
37 
First, the court pointed out that the NLRA depends on agency enforcement, 
while Title VII relies heavily on private enforcement actions. Second, unlike in 
the  NLRA,  Congress  provided  Title  VII plaintiffs  with  remedies,  including 
punitive damages, designed to punish and deter employers who violate the 
statute. Finally, the Ninth Circuit stressed the fact that the Hoffman holding 
was grounded, in part, on the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to defer to the 
NLRB’s  balancing  of  two  competing  federal  statutes—labor  law  and 
immigration law. In a Title VII case, on the other hand, it is a federal court that 
does this balancing, and courts—the Ninth Circuit held—are precisely the right 
institutions to harmonize competing federal laws. This reasoning is important, 
not only because it clarifies why Hoffman is inapposite in the Title VII context. 
Its broader significance is that it reveals why Hoffman does not reach the many 
other  employment  regimes  that  share  Title  VII’s  structure  rather  than  the 
NLRA’s. 
NIBCO is significant in a final, and perhaps even broader, way. Numerous 
courts have been called on to harmonize immigration and labor law—to resolve 
whether and how immigration status impacts the operation of federal labor 
and employment statutes.
38 If there is a common refrain in these cases, it is that 
immigration  status  simply  trumps  labor  rights.
39  The  cases  that  lie  at  the 
intersection  of  labor  and  immigration  law,  that  is,  do  not  reflect  a  careful 
balancing of these two statutory regimes. To the contrary, the cases evince an 
almost  reflexive  prioritization  of  immigration  status  over  labor  protections. 
NIBCO, of course, stands in stark contrast to this approach. The opinion takes 
seriously both federal regimes and, without impinging on the possibility for 
immigration  enforcement,  the  decision  allows  for  robust  enforcement  of 
workplace rights. 
 
37.   NIBCO, 364 F.3d at 1067-69. 
38.   See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. 137. 
39.   One clear example of this trend comes from a case, Montero v. INS, in which the Second 
Circuit  summarized  the  rule  in  this  way:  “[The]  application  of  prospective  labor  law 
remedies to undocumented aliens consistently has been dependent upon whether the alien is 
permitted by the INS to remain in the United States.” 124 F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1997).    
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iii. union organizing 
Our final case comes from the union context; and when it comes to legal 
protection for workers’ efforts to improve their own terms and conditions of 
employment, the most obvious statutory source is the NLRA. Passed in 1935, 
that statute grants workers the right to engage in concerted activity for their 
mutual aid and protection.
40 Judge Reinhardt has authored a slew of opinions 
applying, and giving broad readings to, the core provisions of the NLRA.
41 But 
to illustrate the twin themes of this Feature, it is best to look at a relatively 
recent decision involving unions’ ability to organize new members. 
In  United  Food  and  Commercial  Workers  Union,  Local  1036  v.  NLRB 
(UFCW),  the  union  represented  employees  of  several  retail  food 
establishments and  sought  to  organize  more firms  in  the  same  competitive 
market.
42 A number of workers in the current bargaining unit objected to the 
union’s use of their dues to organize new workers, and they charged the union 
with committing an unfair labor practice. The doctrinal background for the 
case came from the Supreme Court’s Communications Workers of America v. 
Beck decision.
43 There, the Court held, inter alia, that a collective bargaining 
agreement  may  require  all  employees  in  a  bargaining  unit—even  those 
individual “objectors” who do not want to be in the union—to pay union dues. 
But, according to the Beck Court, objectors may only be required to pay those 
dues  that  are  “germane  to  collective  bargaining.”
44  In  Beck,  the  Court  held 
explicitly that politics was not germane to collective bargaining, and so the 
union could not charge objectors for any of its political expenditures. But the 
Beck Court left open the broader question of which nonpolitical expenses were 
in fact germane to collective bargaining. 
In  the  UFCW  case,  a  three-judge  panel  of  the  Ninth  Circuit  held  that 
organizing  new  union  members  was  insufficiently  related  to  bargaining  on 
behalf of existing members to meet Beck’s test for germaneness.
45 For the three-
judge  panel,  organizing  additional  employees  and  representing  existing 
members were distinct enterprises—both part of the union’s overall mission 
 
40.   29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
41.   See, e.g., N. Mont. Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 1999); NLRB v. 
Wilder Constr. Co., 804 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Cam Indus., Inc., 666 F.2d 411 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
42.   249 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2001). 
43.   487 U.S. 735 (1988). 
44.   Id. at 745. 
45.   UFCW, Local 1036, 249 F.3d at 1119-20.    
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but not related closely enough to warrant the imposition on objectors. But, in 
Judge Reinhardt’s opinion for the en banc Ninth Circuit, the court reversed. 
The heart of the opinion begins with a statement about statutory purpose: 
“Organizing,”  Judge  Reinhardt  writes,  “is  central  to  the  purpose  of  the 
NLRA.”
46 It is only through organizing, the opinion continues, that workers 
can hope to bargain collectively to improve the terms and conditions of their 
employment. 
So,  what  about  the  question  before  the  court?  Having  stressed  the 
centrality of organizing generally, how do we know whether organizing new 
members  is  germane  to  the  project  of  bargaining  on  behalf  of  existing 
members? The opinion’s reasoning is straightforward and flows from what 
Judge Reinhardt terms “the realities of collective bargaining.”
47 As he put it: 
    The  specific  question  here  involves  organizing  outside  the  .  .  . 
bargaining unit, in particular the employees of competing employers. 
Such organizing may be crucial to improving the wages, benefits, and 
working conditions of employees in the bargaining unit . . . . The fact 
that an employer’s competitors are not unionized, and likely pay lower 
wages  and  provide  lesser  benefits,  significantly  weakens  the  union’s 
ability  to  bargain  with  the  employer,  and  decreases  the  union’s 
prospects of achieving the economic objectives of the members of the 
bargaining unit.
48 
This statement is almost indisputably accurate—there is little question that a 
union’s ability to organize an increasing share of a market enhances its ability 
to bargain on behalf of its existing members.
49 By reading the statute, and the 
relevant  Supreme  Court  precedent,  in  light  of  these  “realities,”  the  UFCW 
court is able to reach a result that captures the real-world germaneness of new 
organizing: it is inseparable from collective bargaining because the outcomes of 
collective bargaining depend entirely on the extent of organization. 
In  UFCW,  then,  we  again  see  the  commitment  to  protecting  workers’ 
efforts to improve their work lives and the reliance on practical reasoning. The 
 
46.   United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760, 768 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
47.   Id. 
48.   Id. at 768-69. 
49.   See,  e.g.,  RICHARD  B.  FREEMAN  &  JAMES  L.  MEDOFF,  WHAT  DO  UNIONS  DO?  51  (1984) 
(“[T]he  union  wage  premium  depends  strongly  on  the  percentage  of  workers  who  are 
organized.”); David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages 
Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO? A TWENTY-
YEAR PERSPECTIVE 79, 104 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007).    
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UFCW case also highlights a final, broader component of the Reinhardt labor 
jurisprudence:  the  Judge’s  commitment—in  the  face  of  profound  social, 
cultural, and political trends in exactly the opposite direction—to protecting 
the collective rights of workers. Of course, when it passed the NLRA in 1935, 
Congress  declared  it  to  be  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  protect  “the 
exercise by workers of full freedom of association [and] self-organization . . . 
for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  the  terms  and  conditions  of  their 
employment.”
50 Section 7 of that statute, still very much the law today, grants 
to employees the affirmative “right to self-organization, to form, join or assist 
labor  organizations,  .  .  .  and  to  engage  in  .  .  .  concerted  activities  for  the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
51 Despite 
the  statutory  commitment  to  collective  action,  however,  there  has  been 
significant judicial skepticism about, and hostility toward, the central project of 
the NLRA. As many have recounted, both the Supreme Court and the courts of 
appeals have interpreted the NLRA in ways that have dramatically curtailed the 
statute’s scope of coverage, the kinds of workers it protects, the type of conduct 
it enables, and the range of remedies it offers.
52 Although there are numerous 
explanations for this judicial approach to the labor statute, it likely reflects (at 
least in part) some discomfort with the facilitation of collective action—a kind of 
“[d]iminished  judicial  respect  for  group  action  in  the  workplace,”
53  a 
“deemphasis  of  the  rights  of  the  group  in  favor  of  those  of  individual 
workers.”
54 
The UFCW case is illustrative of Judge Reinhardt’s contrary position. The 
case protects the collective rights of workers in a manner that requires some 
sacrifice of the interests of individuals: bargaining unit members who object to 
the union’s use of their dues must pay up, irrespective of their objection. To be 
sure,  Judge  Reinhardt—and  the  UFCW  court—believe  that  the  union  is 
requiring  objectors  to  do  something  that  ultimately  will  redound  to  the 
objectors’ own benefit. The opinion nonetheless stands out as quite distinct 
 
50.   29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
51.   Id. § 157. 
52.   For some examples, see James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the 
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner 
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); 
and  Reuel  E.  Schiller,  From  Group  Rights  to  Individual  Liberties:  Post-War  Labor  Law, 
Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (1999). 
53.   Brudney, supra note 52, at 1591. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983). 
54.   Schiller, supra note 52, at 64.    
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from the more prevalent judicial privileging of individual rights and autonomy 
over the collective interests and power of the union.
55 
 
*  *  * 
 
Three cases cannot fully capture a labor and employment jurisprudence 
that—to date—includes more than 150 opinions. As the other Features in this 
Tribute reflect, moreover, an abiding concern for the ways in which law can be 
used to empower marginalized communities, and a judging style that strives to 
be grounded in the everyday realities of the litigants, are not unique to Judge 
Reinhardt’s labor and employment cases; to the contrary, these commitments 
appear  across  the  full  span  of  Judge  Reinhardt’s  work.  These  three  cases, 
though,  highlight  two  core  themes  of  this  jurisprudence:  the  Judge’s 
commitment  to  ensuring  that  law  functions  as  a  mechanism  of  worker 
empowerment,  and  his  pragmatic  approach  to  interpreting  labor  and 
employment statutes. The cases also reflect the centrality of Judge Reinhardt’s 
jurisprudence to the law of the workplace, a contribution that will endure long 
beyond the Judge’s extraordinary tenure on the bench. 
 
55.   Again, for an excellent historical account of this trend, see id. 